<strong>Bint Jbail, 1920-2026<br></strong><em></em>
Asharq al-Awsat, London, April 16
Bint Jbail, in the Shi’ite collective memory, is not merely a geographic space, as Hezbollah elites now attempt to portray it, as though a field withdrawal from it would be no more than a military loss, despite its deep symbolic weight.
The harsher truth is that its occupation by Israel and its destruction would shake the foundations of contemporary Shi’ite political memory in general, and that of Jabal Amel in particular, reopening the question of belonging to the Lebanese entity that was severed from historical Syria, and revisiting the role of the Shi’ite community in the founding of Greater Lebanon in September 1920, along with the subsequent dilemma of partnership after its consolidation and independence.
Between April 1920 – when French forces entered Bint Jbail, burned it, and displaced its inhabitants – and this April, with Israeli forces seeking to control it, there is a revival of a historical dilemma tied to the fate of Jabal Amel, or Belad Bechara, as it was then known, now the areas south of the Litani River, which have long formed a contested frontier since the early days of French and British mandates.
Lebanese historian Monzer Jaber points to a Franco-British clash over shifting maps and to a British enigma surrounding the violence that followed the 1920 Wadi al-Hujeir conference, where Shi’ite notables initially rejected joining Greater Lebanon in favor of remaining within Greater Syria, before ultimately integrating into the Lebanese state. That decision, he notes, was driven in part by fears of colonial plans to divide Jabal Amel between Lebanon and British-controlled Palestine.
Once this crisis was overcome, integration into Lebanon followed, securing what Jaber calls a recognized “space” for the Shi’ite community – limited but acknowledged participation in administration, taxation, and daily life – marking the emergence of sectarian identity within the framework of the mandate.
Today, however, because Bint Jbail is more than geography, and because the south is integral to the very formation and finality of the Lebanese state for Shi’ites, its potential loss threatens not just land but belonging itself, especially in light of Israeli strategic thinking that seeks expansion under ideological justification – achieving perhaps what Britain could not in 1920.
Historically, Shi’ite elites succeeded in integrating beyond the anxieties of partnership, calibrating their role and power within the state.
But today, after overreaching across the entire Lebanese system, miscalculating ties with Baathist Syria, and aligning fully with Iran’s regional ambitions, the Shi’ite community faces a humanitarian, geographic, and political catastrophe.
If this is not recognized, the result may not be merely a withdrawal from territory, but a deeper rupture – one that echoes past miscalculations and risks repeating them in far more devastating form. – Mustafa Fahs
Opening Hormuz: Beginning of peace or tactical pause?
El Watan, Egypt, April 17
In a dramatic scene reflecting the layered complexity of the Middle East conflict, Iran suddenly announced the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to global navigation for the duration of its negotiations with the United States, effectively reversing its prior policy of closure that had plunged global markets into turmoil and sent energy prices soaring.
The move was met with cautious relief in Western capitals, yet it raises fundamental questions about the nature of ongoing negotiations and whether this step signals genuine goodwill or merely a tactical maneuver within a broader confrontation encompassing Iran’s nuclear file and the future of the region.
What unfolded in Hormuz cannot be understood outside the preceding military and economic context. At the outbreak of war, Iran effectively shut the strait, triggering unprecedented disruption in global energy markets, but at the same time, it pursued alternative routes, notably via the Caspian Sea toward Russia and Europe, demonstrating a multidimensional strategy designed to circumvent isolation and mitigate sanctions.
The reopening thus amounts to an implicit acknowledgment that the cost of closure had become unsustainable, particularly under an expanding US naval blockade that evolved from monitoring shipping into a global interdiction campaign affecting vessels in international waters. With over 40% of Iranian state revenues dependent on oil exports, Tehran faced a stark choice between continued economic depletion and regaining partial relief through reopening.
While the step appears conciliatory, deeper examination reveals persistent divergence. Iran continues to tie navigation to a “coordinated corridor” concept that implies oversight or control, a position firmly rejected by Washington and its allies as a violation of maritime freedom.
Meanwhile, the US blockade remains fully operational, creating a contradiction between political signaling and operational reality that fuels uncertainty among shipping and insurance firms, especially amid lingering risks such as naval mines and speedboat attacks.
This dynamic resembles a careful choreography, with each side signaling restraint while preserving leverage. Beyond Hormuz, core disputes remain unresolved, particularly over uranium enrichment, with the United States demanding a long-term freeze and removal of enriched stockpiles, while Iran insists on retaining both enrichment rights and material for civilian purposes.
The gap is profound and potentially explosive. As such, talk of ending the war remains premature. What is emerging is not peace but a temporary alignment of interests: Washington seeking a diplomatic achievement ahead of costly elections and stabilizing markets, and Tehran seeking economic relief while preserving strategic bargaining chips.
Opening Hormuz may offer a momentary easing of pressure, like opening a window in a suffocating room, but it does not alter the structure of the conflict itself. The war is unlikely to end here; rather, it may be entering a more complex phase of prolonged negotiation, where deeper disputes and competing wills will define the next chapter. – Refa’at Rashad
Iran: Trump's options and the strategy of the brink
Al-Ittihad, UAE, April 18
The US administration is moving toward a strategy of pushing Iran to the brink, through the imposition of a comprehensive naval blockade extending beyond the Strait of Hormuz to include Iranian ports and maritime routes, signaling that the military option remains on the table even as diplomatic channels are intermittently revived.
Washington is not inclined toward partial solutions or incremental compromises; its negotiating approach is binary – either a comprehensive deal or none at all. This places the burden squarely on Tehran to offer substantive concessions, particularly on uranium enrichment, rather than continuing its pattern of partial adjustments and delaying tactics.
The United States seeks decisive outcomes, and its economic pressure campaign is designed to corner Iran strategically, exploiting the vulnerabilities of an already strained economy suffering under sanctions. The expectation in Washington is that sustained pressure will translate into internal strain within Iran, potentially triggering renewed protests or political fractures, especially given the country’s current leadership uncertainties and structural weaknesses.
The American calculus does not rely heavily on NATO participation; rather, it reflects confidence in unilateral capacity under a broader doctrine of comprehensive power.
Iran, aware of this imbalance, finds itself constrained within a narrowing strategic space, with limited viable options and diminishing leverage. Any potential easing of the blockade in future negotiations would come strictly under American terms, reinforcing the consequences of Iran’s earlier miscalculations.
As pressure intensifies, the United States appears prepared to escalate methodically, combining economic strangulation with credible military deterrence, all while monitoring internal Iranian dynamics for signs of instability.
Despite Tehran’s attempts to maneuver and buy time, US President Donald Trump remains committed to a cost-benefit framework that seeks to reshape the strategic landscape, preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear capability and neutralizing its missile systems.
In all scenarios, pressure will persist, whether through continued blockade, renewed military action, or a combination of both, with Washington determined to impose a final settlement on its own terms. – Tarek Fahmy
The courage of Aoun and Salam saved the day
Nida Al Watan, Lebanon, April 17
It is no small detail that a 10-day ceasefire was imposed, nor is it coincidental that Washington chose this precise moment to pressure Benjamin Netanyahu.
What unfolded was the result of a clear choice: direct negotiation, without evasion or dual messaging – a break from a long-standing taboo that had often served as justification for leaving Lebanon hostage to the wars of others.
Here lies the significance of President Joseph Aoun’s stance. He neither bargained nor maneuvered, nor did he hide behind hollow slogans; instead, he chose to reclaim Lebanese decision-making from Tehran, which had not hesitated to drag Lebanon into a war that did not serve its interests.
Prime Minister Nawaf Salam stood as an equal partner in this decision – without hesitation or confusion – confronting a system long accustomed to deciding on behalf of the Lebanese people and imposing the costs of its own ventures on them.
Aoun and Salam did not engage in rhetorical bidding wars; they worked quietly but with firmness, confronting Hezbollah where it must be confronted: in politics, in decision-making, and in defining who holds the authority to declare war and who has the right to end it.
The outcome was an unmistakable diplomatic achievement: halting the war and restoring the state’s authority over its own decisions.
What has occurred is not merely a ceasefire; it is the breaking of a long-standing equation in which Iran decides, and Lebanon executes. Today, that equation is beginning to fracture. Lebanon is once again asserting itself as a state, not an arena.
Has everything ended? Certainly not. But what has been achieved is enough to show that the balance of power is no longer what it once was, and that those who viewed Lebanon as a permanent mailbox are beginning to realize that the address has changed. – Assaad Bechara
Translated by Asaf Zilberfarb. All assertions, opinions, facts, and information presented in these articles are the sole responsibility of their respective authors and are not necessarily those of The Media Line, which assumes no responsibility for their content.