Iran tried to intimidate Saudi Arabia - it may have made Riyadh more powerful instead - opinion

Tehran can drive up oil prices. What it cannot control is the rising price of Saudi cooperation.

The current war is exposing the flaw in that strategy.

Iran can make the Strait of Hormuz more dangerous, push oil prices higher, and pressure US President Donald Trump through American gas prices.

But Tehran’s own ability to profit from those higher prices has been crippled, while Saudi Arabia enters the crisis with infrastructure that allows it to bypass Hormuz and a regional position that is becoming more valuable by the day.

In other words, the more Iran raises the cost of confrontation, the more it may also raise the price of Riyadh.

And that is where the story gets bigger than oil.

Washington needs Saudi Arabia to help build a regional order capable of containing Iran. Israel wants Saudi normalization. Trump could use Riyadh to turn an expensive confrontation with Tehran into a strategic realignment of the Middle East.

Mohammed bin Salman, meanwhile, can afford to wait and see what everyone is prepared to offer.

Iran’s strategy depends partly on making the war economically painful far beyond the battlefield.

But there is a problem.

Iran can help make oil more expensive while increasingly struggling to sell its own. The US blockade has sharply reduced Iranian crude exports, with loadings falling from around two million barrels a day in March to roughly 220,000 to 255,000 barrels a day in August.

Saudi Arabia prepared for a different scenario.

For years, Riyadh invested in infrastructure designed to reduce its exposure to Hormuz. Its East-West Pipeline carries crude from the kingdom’s eastern fields to Yanbu on the Red Sea, allowing part of Saudi exports to bypass the strait.

That investment is paying off. The IMF found in July that rerouting crude through the pipeline helped limit the decline in Saudi oil deliveries, while higher prices more than compensated for lower volumes and produced an oil-revenue windfall.

The irony is hard to miss.

Tehran can make every barrel more valuable while losing the ability to sell enough barrels to fully benefit. Riyadh can still reach the market.

Iran’s energy weapon may be enriching the rival it was supposed to intimidate.

Saudi Arabia’s advantage is not limited to pipelines.

Saudi Arabia deepened its economic relationship with China without abandoning its strategic partnership with Washington. More recently, Riyadh joined Turkey and Pakistan in the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, adding another layer to a security strategy no longer built exclusively around the United States.

None of these relationships can replace Washington. The United States still offers military reach, intelligence, advanced weapons, and financial access that no other Saudi partner can match at the same scale.

But replacing America was never the point.

MBS does not need another America. He needs enough credible alternatives to make America compete for Saudi cooperation.

Iran is making that strategy more valuable.

The more dangerous the Gulf becomes, the more Washington needs partners capable of shaping what comes next. And few countries now occupy a more consequential position than Saudi Arabia.

For years, the Saudi-Israel normalization debate revolved around what Riyadh wanted from Washington.

That is no longer enough to understand the negotiation.

The more important question is increasingly what Washington wants from Riyadh.

The United States wants Saudi weight behind a regional order that limits Iran. Israel wants normalization with the most important Arab state still outside the Abraham Accords. Trump wants an outcome he can present as something larger than another costly confrontation with Tehran.

All three roads run through Riyadh.

That changes MBS’s hand.

The proposed 30-year US-Saudi civilian nuclear cooperation agreement illustrates what is at stake. Washington has linked the deal to normalization with Israel, while Riyadh continues to demand meaningful movement on the Palestinian issue.

Iran’s pressure does not make those differences disappear.

It makes Saudi cooperation more valuable despite them.

The more indispensable Riyadh becomes to the regional architecture Washington wants, the harder it becomes to expect MBS to accept that architecture cheaply.

Tehran’s strategy is supposed to trap Trump between two bad choices. Show restraint, and Washington risks looking unable to protect Gulf shipping and its regional partners. Escalate, and oil prices rise, Americans pay more at the pump, and the political cost grows at home.

But there is a third possibility: Trump could try to turn the Iranian threat into the argument for a much larger bargain with Saudi Arabia.

Washington and Jerusalem would get Saudi participation in a stronger regional framework and, potentially, normalization. Riyadh would seek the security commitments and strategic benefits it has wanted for years.

The Palestinian issue remains a major obstacle. So do the competing interests of all three governments. Nothing about such a bargain is inevitable.

But MBS has something increasingly valuable on his side: time.

He does not have to rush toward Washington, distance himself from China, or accept the first normalization package put in front of him. He can watch the pressure on the Gulf rise and ask a simple question: How much is Saudi cooperation worth now?

For years, Iran’s argument to its Arab neighbors rested on geography. America might eventually leave the Middle East. Iran would not. The Gulf states would therefore have to learn to accommodate Tehran.

Threatening Hormuz was supposed to reinforce that reality. It may be doing the opposite.

Iran wanted Riyadh to feel vulnerable enough to compromise. It may instead be making Riyadh indispensable enough to name its price.