On October 27, Israelis are scheduled to elect a new Knesset. One month later, Palestinians are supposed to elect a legislature for the first time in 20 years. The votes will take place separately, under very different conditions, but they should be understood as parts of one diplomatic moment.
Israel’s election will be the first since October 7, 2023, and the wars that followed. It will become a referendum on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu: on the failures preceding October 7, the conduct of the war, the direction of Israeli democracy, and whether he should continue to lead the country.
The Palestinian election, assuming it takes place, could begin the overdue reconstruction of Palestinian political legitimacy.
Neither vote will automatically produce peace. Elections can strengthen extremists as easily as moderates. But together they create a possibility absent for years: Israeli and Palestinian leaderships emerging simultaneously with renewed public mandates.
More than a referendum on Netanyahu
The Israeli campaign will be dominated by one question: Should Netanyahu remain prime minister?
That matters, but it is not enough. The deeper question is whether Israel will elect a government capable of translating military power into political strategy.
Israel has repeatedly demonstrated its military power. What it has failed to do is define a sustainable political destination. Tactical successes have brought Israel back to the same reality: control over millions of Palestinians, expanding settlements, recurring violence, and stronger extremists on both sides.
Gadi Eisenkot, as a former IDF chief of staff, brings military experience, personal credibility, and a reputation for seriousness. He may be able to tell Israelis things that are otherwise too easily dismissed when coming from civilian peace advocates.
An Eisenkot government would have to answer fundamental questions: Does Israel accept Palestinian self-determination and sovereignty? Will it end settlement expansion and confront violent settlers? Will it accept that Gaza, the West Bank, and Palestinian East Jerusalem must form one political territory?
Eisenkot’s historic opportunity would not be to manage the conflict more professionally. It would be to reject the premise that it can be managed indefinitely. Palestinian freedom is not a reward for terrorism. It is an Israeli security interest. Israel will never have genuine security until Palestinians have freedom, and Palestinians will never achieve freedom until Israelis have security.
Palestinians must restore legitimacy
Mahmoud Abbas was elected president in 2005, and the Palestinian Legislative Council was last elected in 2006. Since then, Palestinians have endured division, authoritarian government, institutional decay, corruption, occupation, and the devastation of Gaza.
Palestinians cannot achieve national liberation through institutions that lack democratic legitimacy. Israel also cannot credibly complain that it has no Palestinian partner while obstructing the elections necessary to produce one.
For the election to matter, Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem must participate as one national electorate. Israel must not determine which candidates are acceptable or prevent Palestinians in East Jerusalem from voting.
Democratic participation also carries obligations. No movement should compete for authority through elections while maintaining an independent army capable of overruling the elected government.
The principle must be: one authority, one law, and one legitimate security force.
Political Islam should transform itself into political parties if those parties accept elections, pluralism, the authority of the elected government, and the end of independent armed action.
Palestinians must also be able to choose new parties, younger leaders, women, independents, reformers, and critics of both Fatah and Hamas. For too long, Palestinian politics has been dominated by movements of the past.
The extremists reinforce each other
Israeli leaders say there is no Palestinian partner. Palestinian leaders say Israel understands only force. Hamas attacks strengthen the Israeli Right. Settlement expansion, settler violence, and occupation strengthen Palestinian rejectionism. Each side points to the extremism of the other to justify its own.
When Israeli candidates reject Palestinian statehood, advocate annexation, or excuse settler violence, Palestinians hear confirmation that diplomacy is pointless. When Palestinian candidates glorify attacks on civilians or refuse to address Israel’s legitimacy, Israelis hear confirmation that withdrawal will bring another war.
Candidates cannot negotiate a final agreement during an election campaign, but they can signal whether one is imaginable. Israeli candidates should say that Palestinian freedom and statehood are Israeli interests. Palestinian candidates should say that Israeli security and regional acceptance are Palestinian interests.
Neither statement requires trust or agreement about history. It requires recognition that neither people is leaving and neither can defeat the other permanently.
The destination must be clear
The United States, Europe, and Arab states should not intervene for particular candidates. They should intervene for a clear diplomatic destination.
Previous peace processes began with transitional arrangements while leaving the final destination uncertain. Temporary Israeli security measures became permanent, while Palestinian obligations appeared to lead not to independence but to a more efficiently administered occupation.
This time, the destination must be declared in advance: two sovereign states based on the 1967 borders with agreed land swaps; Jerusalem as the capital of both; a non-militarized Palestinian state with strong security institutions; an agreed refugee solution; an end to annexation and settlement expansion; and full regional peace and integration.
What has been missing is not a conceptual solution. It is political leadership, effective implementation, and international determination.
US President Donald Trump still has time to act. Washington should support two connected objectives: Israel’s security and regional integration, and Palestinian freedom, democracy, and statehood. It should work with Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, the Gulf states, Turkey, and Europe to build a regional structure.
Israel should be offered normalization and regional integration. Palestine should receive sovereignty, reconstruction, and international guarantees.
Peace cannot depend on trust
I have spent decades speaking with Israelis and Palestinians, including people each side regards as enemies. One conclusion is inescapable: Peace cannot be built on trust alone.
The answer is not to wait until Israelis and Palestinians believe in each other. It is to construct an agreement in which compliance is verified, violations carry predetermined consequences, security responsibilities are clear, and neither side can unilaterally block the other people’s national future.
Palestinian violence must carry consequences. So must settlement construction, annexation, settler terrorism, and unlawful displacement. Obligations cannot apply only to the weaker party.
For years, both peoples have been told there is no partner on the other side. The claim has become self-fulfilling.
The elections could begin to reverse that process. But ballots alone will not do it.
Israeli candidates must tell their public that Palestinian rights are compatible with Israeli security. Palestinian candidates must tell their public that Israeli security and recognition are compatible with Palestinian freedom. International powers must define the destination and show that peaceful political choices produce tangible results.
The opportunity is not that Israelis and Palestinians will suddenly trust one another. They will not. The opportunity is that they may elect leaders who understand that neither freedom nor security can be achieved unilaterally, and that returning to politics after years of war is not a concession.
It is the only way to prevent the next war.