Israelis disagree about many things. They disagree about religion and state, judicial reform, the role of the rabbinate, the draft, transportation on Shabbat, and the proper balance between nationalism and liberalism.
These are real disagreements, and in ordinary times they should be fought vigorously at the ballot box and in the marketplace of ideas.
But these are not ordinary times.
Regardless of who wins the next election, Israel urgently needs a national unity government.
Why? Because on the most important strategic questions facing the Jewish state, the actual distance between the Israeli Center-Left and Center-Right is far smaller than election rhetoric suggests – while the dangers facing Israel from abroad are growing dramatically.
On the central national security issues, there is already a broad Israeli consensus. Almost nobody in mainstream Israeli politics genuinely believes that the current Middle East can sustain a sovereign Palestinian state in the foreseeable future.
The horrors of the October 7 massacre shattered whatever remained of the Oslo-era illusion that territorial withdrawals and diplomatic formulas alone could bring peace.
Likewise, there is broad agreement across the Zionist spectrum on the core pillars of Israeli strategy: preserving military superiority, maintaining a strong free-market economy, expanding the Abraham Accords, deepening ties with India and pragmatic Arab states, and strengthening relations with supportive European countries.
Commonality between Center-Left, Center-Right
The Center-Left and Center-Right may differ in tone, style, or diplomatic packaging. But on the essential strategic realities, they are far closer to one another than either side admits publicly.
And that is precisely why permanent political warfare between them has become so dangerous.
Dark clouds are gathering across the Atlantic.
The bipartisan American consensus that sustained Israel for decades is visibly eroding. Increasingly influential factions within both parties now view military aid to Israel as conditional upon acceptance of Palestinian statehood.
Unless a figure such as Marco Rubio emerges victorious in future American politics, it is entirely plausible that the next US president – whether a progressive Democrat or an “America First” nationalist such as JD Vance – could demand historic concessions from Israel while acting to curtail military, diplomatic, or economic support.
Under such circumstances, Israel cannot afford to appear internally fractured and politically illegitimate.
A narrow coalition governing against half the country would project weakness precisely when Israel’s enemies and rivals are searching for signs of exhaustion and division.
A national unity government would send the opposite message: the Jewish people may debate fiercely among themselves, but when fundamental national interests are at stake, they stand together.
Jewish history itself warns us what happens when internal rivalries spiral into national self-destruction.
The Talmudic story of Kamtza and Bar Kamtza remains painfully relevant. The destruction of the Second Temple is portrayed not merely as the result of Roman power, but of Jewish factionalism, humiliation, hatred, and the inability of elites to restrain destructive internal rivalries.
One need not accept every detail of the Aggadah literally to grasp its enduring political wisdom.
For years, Israel’s internal political and cultural divisions have increasingly spilled into international media, academic institutions, and Western political discourse. Legitimate criticism of Israeli governments has too often evolved into mutual delegitimization between Jews themselves, weakening the country’s moral cohesion precisely when its adversaries seek to isolate it internationally. Israel’s enemies have repeatedly exploited internal Jewish divisions to reinforce narratives portraying the Jewish state as fundamentally fractured and morally compromised.
The consequences are visible everywhere: on campuses, in international institutions, in growing segments of Western media, and increasingly within political parties once considered reliably pro-Israel.
History also teaches that national unity governments can succeed spectacularly in times of crisis.
During World War I and World War II, Britain survived because rival political factions subordinated partisan interests to patriotism. The wartime coalitions led by David Lloyd George and later by Winston Churchill allowed Britain to mobilize the full moral, political, economic, and military resources of the nation.
Israel itself has repeatedly benefited from unity governments.
Before the Six Day War, a national unity government transformed fear and paralysis into one of the greatest moments in modern Jewish history. In the 1980s, broad coalition cooperation helped defeat rampant hyperinflation and stabilize the Israeli economy.
The precedent already exists.
The real question is: what is the alternative?
A narrow Center-Left coalition dependent upon Mansour Abbas and the Islamic Movement?
Or a narrow Center-Right coalition dependent upon sectarian haredi parties led by figures such as Moshe Gafni and Yitzhak Goldknopf?
Both options would deepen internal resentment and intensify the perception that one half of the country is governing against the other half.
Both would further inflame culture wars over budgets, military service, demography, religion, and the distribution of national burdens.
And both would weaken Israel internationally precisely when strategic cohesion is most needed.
A national unity government will not magically eliminate ideological disagreements. Nor should it.
But it can establish a broad strategic consensus around: national security, economic productivity, regional alliances, shared national service, greater integration of all communities into the workforce, and responsible long-term demographic and fiscal policy.
Israelis must decide whether politics exists to strengthen the country – or whether the country itself will surrender its fate to partisan warfare.
Israel is rapidly approaching such a moment.
The enemies surrounding the Jewish state do not distinguish between left-wing Jews and right-wing Jews, secular Jews and religious Jews, Tel Aviv and Judea, Ashkenazim and Mizrahim.
Neither should Israelis when the survival, strength, and legitimacy of their state are increasingly on the line.
The writer is an Italian-Colombian independent political analyst based in Berlin. A graduate of Yale and Hebrew University, he can be reached at rafaelcastro78@gmail.com