Iranian regime faces pressure as Kurds, US strengthen cooperation - opinion

Alongside this, the Pentagon is bringing in a further 5,000 Marines, and some 2,000 paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division, some of whom have already sailed or are being flown in. A further surge of 10,000 ground troops is under consideration.

“If we are not on this battlefield,” he said, “the end of the regime will either not occur, or be delayed by a lot.”

Hosseini is the secretary-general of the Khabat Organization of Iranian Kurdistan, a long‑standing Iranian Kurdish opposition party, based in exile in Iraqi Kurdistan.

On February 22, Khabat became one of five founding members of the new Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan (CPFIK).

A number of think tanks and commentators now adjudge the CPFIK as a significant new factor in the Iranian opposition. The coalition’s objectives include overthrowing the Islamic Republic and creating a democratic Kurdish entity in Iranian Kurdistan, on the lines of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq.

In practice, these twin aims are only partly viable. The coalition can certainly coordinate opposition and support protests.

However, its most ambitious goals – toppling the Islamic Republic and securing Kurdish self-determination – could be achieved only as part of some larger initiative, and with substantial military support.

In Iraq, Peshmerga forces were key in the 2017 defeat of ISIS. In Syria, the Syrian Democratic Forces, with its major Kurdish element, became the main US-backed ground partner in 2015. The territorial defeat of ISIS in Syria was announced in March 2019.

The CPFIK has unified five major Kurdish parties after years of internal fragmentation. A firm and clearly defined Kurdish stance is a strength in a situation where the various Iranian opposition entities are fragmented. Kurdish unity is an example of disciplined coordination that other opposition elements could emulate.

As the price for their cooperation, the Kurds require support for Kurdish autonomy within a restructured Iran. Cooperation will be fragile if opposition figures regard Kurdish demands as a separatist threat. It would be politic to accept them as part of a post-regime settlement.

In 2013, Pahlavi launched an umbrella movement – the Iran National Council – and has since worked hard attempting to unite monarchists, secular democrats, and defectors around a post-Islamic Republic transition.

Presenting himself as a figure recognized and respected by the vast majority of the Iranian people, Pahlavi is offering to lead the nation into a new, post-revolutionary future.

He specifically does not seek a restoration of the monarchy above any other form of constitutional democracy. Instead, he advocates a referendum of the Iranian people through which they would select the constitution they prefer.

As an instrument of regime change, however, Pahlavi’s network is not, by itself, a realistic mechanism for toppling the Islamic Republic.

His strongest asset is symbolic: he is, in his very person, a link to Iran’s past. Nostalgia for the prerevolutionary era has been a feature of the vast popular demonstrations in recent years. Pahlavi could serve as a rallying point and a unifying force holding disparate opposition forces together.

There is a snag. At the moment, Pahlavi’s published road map and public messaging do not accord with Kurdish aspirations.

The exiled crown prince promises equal individual rights and non‑discrimination for Kurds and other minorities, but stops short of endorsing a federal “Iranian Kurdistan” on the Iraqi model. In fact, he stresses territorial integrity over any ethnically defined region with self‑rule.

Moreover, he has urged Kurds and other minorities not to use the present conflict “to press for separation.” But Kurdish alliance statements in 2026 explicitly reaffirm Kurdish rights and federal‑style autonomy “within a unified Iran.”

A failure to reach some form of compromise could rule out collaboration between the Pahlavi organization and the CPFIK – a formidable Kurdish fighting force.

How much might that matter? Pahlavi has never received a positive endorsement from US President Donald Trump. The furthest Trump would go is to say he would be fine with Pahlavi if the Iranians themselves accepted him.

But on March 3, Trump was reported as saying, “It seems to me that somebody from within maybe would be more appropriate.” On March 22, he said the US had held talks with a “top person” in Iran and had identified “major points of agreement.”

On March 23, the American president told reporters that Washington was in contact with the “right people” in Iran and that the US and Iran were “in negotiations right now.”

Tehran has consistently denied that talks were in progress.

America’s natural allies on the Iranian scene are clearly the Kurds, particularly the formidable Kurdish Peshmerga fighting force.

It had been thought that Trump had more or less ruled out US boots on Iranian soil, but the facts seem to point to a build-up of American forces in the region.

Meanwhile, accounts have appeared in the media of limited desertions and refusals to obey orders by both the Iranian police and the regular army.

These reports, if accurate, could indicate that large-scale anti-government demonstrations or some form of direct attack could lead to a neutralized Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Ergo, defections to the popular cause from within both forces are not out of the question.