Voices from the Arab press: Iran threatens global shipping in Strait of Hormuz

Yet Iran faces its own dilemma: mining the waterway would also block its own ships and prevent the export of Iranian oil, which has continued despite the war. Washington, meanwhile, has strong incentives to keep global oil prices low. By ensuring sufficient supply to the market, the US has allowed Iran to continue exporting oil and has even relaxed some sanctions on Russian energy exports. Rising oil prices could quickly damage the US economy and undermine President Donald Trump’s ability to sustain the war for the several additional weeks he may need to achieve his objectives.

Trump has threatened to seize control of the Strait of Hormuz, but such an operation would be extremely difficult to accomplish through air and naval power alone. The experience of the campaign against the Houthis in Yemen illustrates the challenge: Despite weeks of aerial and naval bombardment, Houthi forces continued attacking ships near the Bab el Mandeb Strait. As long as any force can reach the coastline and launch drone boats or missiles, maritime traffic remains vulnerable – especially in a narrow passage like Hormuz, where the distance between the two shores is only 34 km.

Securing the Strait would likely require the US to seize Iranian islands in the area and control coastal zones near Bandar Abbas, effectively necessitating a large-scale ground operation. So far, however, no American ground troops have arrived in the region despite media reports suggesting preparations involving the US Army’s 82nd Airborne Division. Washington may also attempt to rely on local opposition forces inside Iran, as reports have noted increased activity by armed groups in Tehran and other cities in recent days.

The US-Israeli military campaign against Iran continues to unfold according to a defined target list, with Washington seeking to bring the confrontation to a decisive conclusion as quickly as possible. Yet if the war drags on, the strategy may require reassessment, particularly given the different approaches adopted by the US and Israel.

Washington remains focused on the primary declared objectives of the campaign, concentrating its efforts on Iran’s missile infrastructure and key military installations buried deep inside the country. Despite early expectations that the Iranian regime might collapse within weeks, that scenario has not materialized. The regime continues to function despite heavy strikes on Iranian territory, suggesting that the US may require more time to complete its military objectives before shifting toward negotiations from a position of strength.

This transition will not be easy. Internal dynamics in Iran remain uncertain, and so far, there have been no major defections from the Revolutionary Guard or divisions within the Iranian army. These realities may force Washington to reconsider elements of its current strategy – especially if Iran’s newly selected supreme leader eventually becomes a target.

Israel, by contrast, appears to be concentrating more heavily on threats closer to its borders, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israeli planners increasingly view the Lebanese front as the most immediate danger, and there are growing indications that the conflict there may expand. Military operations could eventually extend beyond southern Lebanon into deeper Lebanese territory as part of a broader effort to neutralize Hezbollah’s capabilities. Such a campaign could also spill into Iraq and Syria, potentially restoring a multi-front confrontation along Israel’s regional perimeter and even extending toward the Jordanian border.

Within this framework, Israel is approaching developments in Iran with several priorities in mind. Chief among them is eliminating what it considers an existential threat by dismantling Iran’s nuclear and missile programs entirely. Much of the direct military effort against nuclear facilities, however, remains primarily an American responsibility. At the same time, Israeli planners remain alert to the possibility of Iranian retaliation, including potential strikes against Israeli nuclear installations. Facilities such as the Dimona reactor and the Nahal Sorek nuclear center could remain potential targets should Tehran broaden its list of objectives.

These dynamics raise an important question: Is there a growing divergence between Washington and Tel Aviv? Israel seeks the complete removal of the Iranian threat, while the US appears more open to a limited military campaign followed by negotiations with whatever Iranian leadership emerges. Washington is still reviewing its broader strategic approach, which may ultimately clash with Israel’s preference for achieving decisive military outcomes first. President Trump, however, appears focused on completing specific operational goals before moving toward a political transition in Iran. Israeli officials remain skeptical that any such political transition would produce stability or security, even if the fighting ends.

As the confrontation between Iran on one side and the US and Israel on the other continues to escalate, Tehran has widened the battlefield by striking Gulf states that have not been directly involved in the war. Since the conflict began, roughly 3,000 missiles and drones have reportedly been launched toward countries across the region, targeting civilian infrastructure and critical facilities. These figures reveal more than a military escalation; they reflect a strategic calculation aimed at spreading the costs of war across multiple regional actors.

The underlying logic assumes that confronting nearby states is easier and less costly than directly confronting distant adversaries. Yet history suggests the opposite: attacks on neighboring countries rarely weaken them, but instead strengthen their internal cohesion and expose the limitations of the aggressor’s strategy. In asymmetric warfare, such tactics are often intended to distribute damage widely in the hope that economic and political pressure will compel regional states to intervene diplomatically or push for an end to hostilities. In practice, however, this approach tends to generate long-term political losses.

International law clearly protects civilians and civilian infrastructure, and attacking countries that are not party to the conflict undermines the legal and political foundations governing relations between states. When missiles and drones begin targeting cities and infrastructure in neighboring countries, the consequences extend far beyond the battlefield and reshape regional relationships.

For this reason, targeting neighbors does little to alter the balance of power but instead creates long-term political damage. Relations between neighboring states ultimately depend on a minimum level of mutual trust – even in times of rivalry. Once that trust is shattered, rebuilding diplomatic channels becomes far more difficult. In this sense, the policy can be described as a form of diplomatic suicide.

Whatever the outcome of the current war, it will eventually end with either a new balance of power or a negotiated settlement. At that moment, global powers will return to their own strategic calculations, while the countries of the region will remain responsible for rebuilding a viable regional order. Yet attacks against neighbors during moments of crisis leave deep scars in political memory and complicate future reconciliation. Moreover, such tactics often produce the opposite of their intended effect. Instead of dividing regional states or forcing them to apply political pressure, attacks frequently strengthen coordination among them and accelerate cooperation in defense and security.

Ultimately, a nation’s strength is not measured by the number of missiles it launches or by its ability to widen the circle of conflict, but by its capacity to manage crises rationally and protect its long-term interests. States confident in their strategic vision remain focused on stability, development, and the welfare of their people. Those that lose their strategic compass, by contrast, often drift toward short-sighted military adventures in which attacking neighbors becomes a substitute for effective political strategy. What the current war reveals – regardless of its final outcome – is the danger of entering conflict without balanced political calculations and the disastrous consequences of turning geographic neighbors into enemies whose relationships will endure long after the war itself has ended. – Youssef al Dini

Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps has targeted Bahrain with a series of missile and drone attacks, violating the kingdom’s sovereignty and placing both citizens and residents at risk. In the face of these assaults, the moment calls for reaffirming the values that have long defined Bahraini society – cooperation, solidarity, and a sense of brotherhood that transcends sectarian and regional divisions.

Bahraini society has historically been known for its openness and cultural diversity. The country has welcomed people and traditions from across the world, and this pluralism is visible in Manama itself, where mosques of different Islamic traditions stand alongside Hindu temples, Sikh gurdwaras, Jewish synagogues, and Christian churches. This coexistence has shaped Bahrain’s collective identity and formed a national culture rooted in tolerance. At a time of heightened tension, recalling this diverse heritage is essential to prevent sectarian incitement and to reinforce a national spirit that transcends narrow identities.

Wars inevitably attract those who seek to exploit chaos for personal gain or ideological agendas. Such actors – regardless of their political or sectarian affiliation – attempt to inflame divisions and mobilize society around exclusionary narratives. These “blood merchants,” however, do not serve the national interest; rather, they pursue their own ambitions while undermining social cohesion.