Lebanon is widely known as the “Land of the Cedars” because its mountains were once blanketed with the statuesque trees. For Israelis, however, a more fitting moniker for their neighbor to the north might be the Land of Illusions.
From Israel’s establishment in 1948, Jerusalem harbored a series of illusions about Lebanon - assumptions about how the country would behave, about how its internal politics would restrain Hezbollah, and about its ability to act like a normal state. Again and again, those assumptions collided with Lebanon’s far more complicated and unpredictable reality.
In the early years, there was a widespread belief that Lebanon - then dubbed the “Switzerland of the Middle East” - would be the first Arab country to sign a peace agreement with the Jewish state.
That proved illusory.
In the early 1980s, the government of Menachem Begin believed a peace treaty with Lebanon could be forged by backing president Bashir Gemayel.That proved illusory.
From 1985 to 2000, Israel believed that by maintaining control of southern Lebanon, together with the South Lebanon Army, it could ensure quiet in the North.
That, too, proved illusory.
Lebanon simply never responds the way it is supposed to - or the way Israel assumes it will.
That reality needs to be kept in mind when debating where Israel should go from here regarding Lebanon.
What should it do to quell the rocket fire that is once again bedeviling the North?
How does Israel move forward with lebanon?
Should it carve out a buffer zone in southern Lebanon and remain there until there is regime change in Iran - the one development that could truly free Lebanon from Hezbollah’s grip? Not because the Shi’ite movement would disappear, but because without Iranian money and backing - the oxygen that sustains it - Hezbollah would no longer be able to call the shots in Lebanon.
Should Israel instead strike Lebanese infrastructure in an effort to compel the government in Beirut to do what it has so far been both unwilling and unable to do - live up to its obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1701, adopted in 2006, to disarm Hezbollah? That obligation was reaffirmed in part in the 2024 ceasefire agreement and again in an understanding reached with Washington in 2025 in return for financial aid.
Or should Israel pursue negotiations with Lebanon - an idea reportedly floated by the French, Lebanon’s former colonial power, and perhaps backed by Saudi Arabia - aimed at reaching a non-aggression pact?
Such an agreement could include Beirut’s recognition of Israel - though Jerusalem has prospered for years without that recognition, while Lebanon has only grown weaker - and an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon.
For now, however, events on the ground are moving in the opposite direction. Rather than preparing to withdraw forces from the south, the IDF is deploying additional troops.
The reason is straightforward: to create a buffer zone that would prevent Hezbollah, which was supposed to have been disarmed but clearly has not been, from moving back south and once again threatening Israeli communities with anti-tank missiles.
At the moment, the north is being pounded with steep-trajectory projectiles - rockets and mortars - which is bad enough. But imagine if Hezbollah were again positioned, as it was before Israel’s 2024 Operation Northern Arrows, deep in southern Lebanon and able to strike northern communities directly with anti-tank missiles.
To prevent Hezbollah from creeping back toward the border, the IDF is now seeking to create that sterile buffer zone.
Still, much of what is currently being discussed regarding Lebanon risks falling into the same trap that has shaped Israeli thinking about the country for decades.
The idea that Israel could remain in southern Lebanon for the long term, maintaining a buffer zone indefinitely, carries its own dangers. Israel tried that once before. Over time, the presence of Israeli forces inevitably turned the local population against Israel and helped create the very resistance it was meant to prevent.
Equally questionable is the notion that UNIFIL, under the French-proposed plan, could suddenly play any meaningful role. This is not only illusory, but it is also laughable. For decades, the international force has proven largely ineffective, unable or unwilling to prevent Hezbollah from rearming and entrenching itself across southern Lebanon.
It is also difficult to place much faith in the idea that the Lebanese government will dismantle Hezbollah. Time and again, Beirut has promised to do so, and time and again it has failed, either because it lacked the will, lacked the ability, or both.
Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar made that point bluntly on Sunday, noting that since the November 2024 ceasefire, “Lebanon hasn’t really done what it should have done in order to disband Hezbollah.” Hezbollah-affiliated ministers remain part of the Lebanese government, he said, and the organization continues to operate according to instructions “from Tehran, not from Beirut.”
A weaker Hezbollah
Still, one factor may make the current moment somewhat different from previous rounds of diplomacy: Hezbollah itself. The organization has not been destroyed, but it has been significantly weakened - militarily, politically, and financially. Its ability to dominate Lebanon’s political system and dictate the country’s course is not what it once was.
That does not mean Hezbollah will disappear. But a weaker Hezbollah may create a narrow opening in which other Lebanese actors - and outside powers - have greater room to maneuver.
None of this means negotiations will succeed. Expecting a peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon in the foreseeable future is unrealistic. But diplomacy does not depend on Lebanon suddenly becoming a stronger state or Hezbollah suddenly disappearing. It requires only the possibility that overlapping Israeli, Lebanese, and regional interests might temporarily produce workable arrangements.
That is the key distinction. Many of the assumptions that shaped Israel’s Lebanon policy in the past depended on Lebanon behaving differently than it has - that its internal politics would restrain Hezbollah, that the Lebanese state would eventually impose its authority, or that outside forces could substitute for the state’s weakness. Negotiations make no such assumption. They simply test whether interests can be aligned externally.
Since Israel has already tried the other options - a long-term security zone, international forces, and relying on Beirut’s promises - testing something new may be the best course left.
Negotiations are not a solution. They are simply the least illusory option currently on the table.