The real threat to Israeli democracy is economic, not just political - analysis

This is not a footnote. It is a warning sign.

If this is the so-called “bloc of repair,” then it must be said clearly: repair cannot mean rolling backward.

The yearning to return to the “Israel of before” the current government is a convenient illusion, but it is also a dangerous one.

Even before the October 7 war, Israel found itself in deep socio-economic deficiency, hidden behind the fog of the global economic matrix that showed Israel experiencing rapid growth. Deep social inequalities, eroded public services, a pervasive sense of abandonment in the periphery, and a state that gradually drifted away from the basic idea of civic solidarity.

The same Israel that was so proud in handling the COVID-19 pandemic, due to its efficient health services, has had more than two decades of underfunded health services. And after three years of ongoing war, the Israeli public suffers the cost, with endless waiting for basic health services like specialist doctors or checkups.

Anyone promising to simply “turn back the clock” is not offering repair, but preservation of the problem.

Israel’s liberal bloc tends to define itself through the defense of institutions: the justice system, a free press, good governance, and, of course, the fight against corruption. This is an important mission, but it is not enough.

Here lies the blind spot of Israeli liberalism: for years, it has embraced – at times enthusiastically – a doctrine of shrinking the state and relying almost blindly on the market.

But the Israeli market has never been truly “free;” it is a concentrated market limited by size and geographical location, skewed by power, and often serves narrow interests. The result has been twofold: inefficiency and unfairness – and, above all, a profound erosion of trust.

The data are clear: Israel’s civilian expenditure is about 9.6% of GDP, lower than the OECD average – an almost unfathomable gap of roughly 194 billion NIS, about 51 billion USD, each year. This shortfall translates directly into the erosion of government services such as education, healthcare, and employment.

At the same time, the growing wage gap between the private and public sectors made it increasingly difficult for the government to attract and retain high-quality personnel. These are not isolated failures, but the cumulative result of neo-liberal economic policy.

Anyone who believes democracy can be safeguarded without addressing the economic and social roots of its erosion is ignoring the central lesson of recent years. The struggle for democracy is also a struggle over distribution, labor, and public services. This is not an ideological add-on – it is the core.

It is not just the Israeli case but also the American one. There is a straight line between democracy and inclusive growth. When former president Joe Biden created the Bidenomics reforms, trying to implement the “economy for all” policy, he strengthened the pillars of American democracy.

While the current era of US President Donald Trump not only divides the country but also gives a free pass for billionaires like Elon Musk to the American economy, he leaves behind the middle and working classes to face the growing cost of living.

Regarding the Israeli case, the liberal bloc must break free from the confines of a narrow liberal democracy and move toward a socio-economic democracy – not as decoration, but as a full-fledged political project.

This also requires shattering several myths. No, competition alone will not lower the cost of living. No, privatization is not synonymous with efficiency. And no, fiscal responsibility does not necessitate the continual erosion of civilian services.

On the contrary, a small and weakened state is not a responsible one; it is a state that relinquishes its ability to shape its own future, abandoning its citizens to a daily struggle for survival.

For this to be more than a slogan, it must be accompanied by a concrete plan of action, which means courageous politicians who need to see the future of Israel over the next five years, 10 years, and the next 20 years, not just the “day after Bibi.”

Any future coalition formed in the name of “saving democracy” that does not commit in advance to big socio-economic change is destined to fail – not for lack of good intentions, but because it will leave intact the very conditions that undermine democracy from within.

If the liberal bloc in Israel fails to make this transition, someone else will – only in the opposite direction. The public will not relinquish its demand for economic security and dignity.

These are the realities of daily life. The question is who will answer that demand: an expanding democracy, or a narrowing, increasingly radical politics.

This is the moment to stop longing for the past. This is the moment to decide what kind of future to build.

Those who offer a clear future – one that invests in everyone – will be the ones who build Israel.■