What does victory look like in Lebanon?
One of the self-inflicted wounds of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s rhetoric has been his call for complete victory against Hezbollah in the North and Hamas in the South:
“We will fight until we achieve victory – total victory; there is no substitute for it.”
Israel “must defeat” Hezbollah and will continue degrading it “until all our objectives are met.”
When you set the bar so high, it risks minimizing the accomplishments already achieved. It would be ideal if the Lebanese government were independent of Hezbollah and exercised full control over its military, but that is a fantasy. Still, that does not mean there is no viable pathway to securing Israel’s northern border through a combination of military action, buffer zones, and translating those gains into diplomatic achievements.
Israel must be perceived in the region as strong and willing to use decisive force to prevent its citizens from living under constant threat, running to bomb shelters with only seconds’ notice. If the people of the North are not secure, that would constitute defeat.
For Americans, the path forward in Lebanon appears relatively straightforward: disarm Hezbollah; strengthen the Lebanese government and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF); and enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559, which require Lebanon to maintain a single sovereign military force and disarm all rival militias, including Hezbollah.
But is this realistic or an American Middle East fantasy, reminiscent of nation-building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s?
The American illusion
The United States believes a significant first step was achieved when it brought Israeli and Lebanese ambassadors to Washington for meetings, an important symbolic move toward normalization. This was indeed notable, as it challenged long-standing Lebanese prohibitions on contact with Israel.
However, the American blind spot lies in viewing the Lebanese government as the primary actor in this conflict. The fight in Lebanon is between Hezbollah and Israel, not Lebanon and Israel.
Hezbollah is a state within a failed state. Despite being significantly degraded by Israeli military action, it remains the most powerful military force in Lebanon.
The ceasefire, imposed by US President Donald Trump on Israel, intended to encourage Iranian participation in negotiations, effectively handed a strategic victory to Iran. It underscored that Hezbollah operates as a division of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and that the Lebanese theater is inseparable from the broader conflict with Iran.
Those who argue otherwise overlook Hezbollah’s adherence to Iran’s Supreme Leader under the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih, and its role as a central component of Iran’s “ring of fire” around Israel.
Israel’s current buffer zone extends approximately five to eight kilometers from the border, reducing the threat posed by anti-tank guided missiles such as the 9M133 Kornet to northern communities. However, drones and longer-range missiles continue to strike both IDF positions and civilian areas from much greater distances – even during the ceasefire.
If Israel is not permitted by Trump to continue its campaign to further degrade Hezbollah’s still-formidable capabilities, that would amount to a victory for both Hezbollah and Iran.
With roughly half of Lebanon’s population Shi’ite, many either ideologically aligned with Hezbollah or dependent on its social services, [the task of] weakening the group will take months, if not years. The Lebanese government would need to build an alternative social services network to replace Hezbollah’s entrenched system.
At the same time, many Lebanese fear that if Hezbollah perceives an existential threat, it could trigger another civil war to preserve its dominance. This risk makes Christians, Druze, and Sunni Arabs, many of whom oppose Hezbollah, reluctant to push aggressively for its disarmament. They fear that assassinations and internal chaos would follow.
Trump has expressed interest in facilitating a meeting between Lebanese President Michel Aoun and Prime Minister Netanyahu to define borders, deconflict tensions, and begin normalization. However, Hezbollah still effectively holds veto power over government decisions, and the LAF remains compromised by infiltration, including within its intelligence services.
A more realistic approach requires incremental, step-by-step measures to stabilize the frontier while enabling long-term reform within the LAF.
Steps, not solutions
Discussions with IDF officers who liaise with American intermediaries working with the LAF suggest several achievable steps. One key improvement would be direct coordination between Israeli and LAF officers to manage deconfliction.
Currently, messages passed through American mediators are often ignored or delayed when Israel identifies Hezbollah activity in southern Lebanon. A more effective mechanism would involve direct meetings between Israeli and LAF officers in southern Lebanon, with American officials present to facilitate coordination.
Rebuilding an uncompromised LAF must proceed gradually, battalion by battalion, with American assistance in vetting personnel to ensure they are not affiliated with Hezbollah. These vetted units could then assume control over specific areas in southern Lebanon. Over time, expanding from battalions to brigades would allow the Lebanese government to regain control of its military and territory, fulfilling the mandate of UNSC Resolution 1559.
At present, the LAF is both unwilling and unable to confront Hezbollah at its current strength, and Lebanon’s non-Shi’ite political leadership is similarly constrained. Continued Israeli military pressure, effectively doing the work the LAF cannot, may be necessary to further weaken Hezbollah, creating space for gradual institutional reform.
However, the desire for a rapid resolution risks undermining long-term stability. A premature “solution” imposed on Lebanon would likely perpetuate the cycle of state weakness and militant dominance.
While I am generally skeptical of incremental approaches, in Lebanon’s case, a state that has struggled with instability for generations, it may be the only viable path.
As Ibtissam Klait, researcher in the MENA region, noted:
“Israel and the government of Lebanon recently held direct talks in Washington. But while the Lebanese leadership may seek de-escalation and stability, Hezbollah’s autonomous military capacity prevents the state from implementing a coherent national strategy. Hezbollah, under the direct tutelage of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, has evolved from a ‘state within a state’ to a ‘state against the state.’”
Ultimately, even this incremental approach may not be sufficient. Lasting stability in Lebanon may depend on a broader regional shift – namely, a transformation in Iran itself. Only when the Iranian regime no longer pursues revolutionary, expansionist ambitions will Lebanon have a genuine opportunity to free itself from Hezbollah’s grip.■
Dr. Mandel is the director of MEPIN, the Middle East Political Information Network; senior security editor of The Jerusalem Report; and briefs members of Congress, their foreign policy advisers, the State Department, and think tanks.