The Moroccan Ministry of the Interior officially confirmed the existence of an online campaign falsely encouraging people to attempt to reach Ceuta.
This came after more than 50,000 people crossed into Ceuta by land and sea on Thursday last week in an unprecedented surge. More than 48,000 returned to Morocco within 48 hours and more did so over the weekend, Spanish authorities said.
Speaking Sunday evening, Ministry Spokesperson Rachid Khalfi said the border crossings "were not the result of temporary or spontaneous factors" but resulted from "the interaction of several overlapping factors."
Specifically, he cited "the excessive exploitation of digital platforms, the dissemination of misleading information, the role of human trafficking networks, and incorrect interpretations of legal and administrative information."
Khalfi said these factors were used to create the "false impression" that it was possible and easy to reach European territory without legal consequences, and that the border was open.
He confirmed that the Public Prosecutor's Office has opened judicial investigations into the various circumstances behind the events, with the aim of "identifying those responsible, and determining the appropriate legal consequences in accordance with the law."
Chronology of the coordinated media campaign
José María Gil Garre, Co-Director of the International Security Observatory, released on Sunday a 70-page report into the disinformation campaign that stimulated the invasion of Ceuta.
Gil said the campaign began at the beginning of July across social networks from profiles in Algeria, Tunisia, France and observations from the US.
He presents a full chronological reconstruction of the precipitating events behind the incursion.
Gil said the first phase began on July 8, 2026, the date on which the Spanish Supreme Court issued a ruling concerning the return of migrants intercepted at sea with destinations in Ceuta and Melilla. In the days immediately afterward, "simplified and decontextualized interpretations" began, presenting the ruling as a supposed guarantee of permanent residence in Spanish territory.
Between July 8 and July 15, this narrative gradually expanded across social networks and messaging services. The evidence collected by Gil showed an increase in posts reproducing similar messages, sometimes accompanied by short audiovisual content, images, and comments designed to reinforce the perception that there was an immediate opportunity to gain access to Spanish territory.
By mid-July, Gil noted the first indicators of a transition from a primarily narrative phase toward an operational phase. His investigation identified the gradual arrival of people to the Fnideq (Castillejos) area from different Moroccan cities, while activity increased in existing Facebook groups and messaging channels used to exchange practical information about routes, schedules, and travel conditions.
Around July 25, "a qualitative shift" occurred in the nature of the content being distributed. Maps began circulating that showed routes for swimming from the Moroccan coast toward Ceuta and Melilla, accompanied by references to distances, departure points, and basic recommendations for completing the journey.
On July 27, digital activity experienced another acceleration. The evidence documents a significant increase in certain Facebook groups dedicated to exchanging information about access to Ceuta, alongside intensified circulation of videos, photographs, and messages related to preparing for the journey. During the same phase, content on TikTok and other audiovisual platforms also increased, strengthening the campaign’s visibility and expanding its reach among potential participants.
On July 28, one of the most relevant elements of the investigation emerged: the identification of a public messaging group called “Hijma Kiraib Setba” (هجرة قريبة سبتة, “Migration close to Ceuta”), administered from a telephone number with an Algerian international prefix (+213). The group distributed messages related to mobilization toward Ceuta.
During July 29 and 30, the campaign reached its highest intensity. The frequency of publications increased significantly, and specific instructions began circulating regarding schedules, meeting points, recommended equipment, and travel conditions.
During the night of July 30-31, the event with the greatest operational impact occurred, with a mass attempt to enter Spanish territory through the Ceuta area.
Although Gil said the nature of the platforms makes it impossible to determine an exact count of messages distributed without access to their internal systems, the information collected showed that the digital campaign may have generated between one and five million impressions, relying on communities that collectively exceeded 250,000 members and on profiles capable of reaching audiences of several million views.
The two accounts with the highest reach and interest were two Moroccan TikTok accounts, @haragaa_ceuta1 and @haragama00. These collectively had over 400,000 followers.
This was followed by two Algerian WhatsApp code groups designed to coordinate activity and provide logistical information. This was then followed by three Moroccan Instagram accounts and a Moroccan Facebook account with tens of thousands of followers each.
Overall, the research documented more than 11 million potential impressions, resulting from the aggregation of views of audiovisual content, members of digital communities, posts, comments, and interactions recorded during the analyzed period.
The investigation concluded that the digital dimension played a significant role in the dissemination of narratives, the circulation of information, and the coordination of physical movements, showing the power of social media in mobilizing real activity.