A ceasefire with Iran may have stopped the immediate exchange of missiles or drones, but just like the last war, less than a year ago, it will not halt the technological processes that underpin Iran’s arsenal of ballistic missiles and drones still aimed at and primed to be launched toward Israel and the Gulf states.
Tehran’s missile and drone programs are long‑term strategic projects that have advanced through close to half a century with periods of both conflict and calm as these systems are central to Iran’s national security doctrine.
The Islamic Republic of Iran’s emphasis on missile and drone technology is rooted in structural constraints. The country’s Air Force – already aging and limited – was severely degraded during the war. Not only have sanctions restricted access to modern aircraft and parts, but many of the aircraft they possessed were struck in the opening days of the war.
An Israeli F-35 also downed an Iranian aircraft, marking the first air-to-air combat hit by an aircraft in decades.
As a result, Tehran has invested heavily in alternatives that allow it to project power and deter adversaries. It views its missile and drone technology as a potent substitute for an air force, enabling it to reach targets across the region and even further, into the Indian Ocean close to some 4,000 kilometers away.
Over the past 40 years, Iran has been massively increasing its inventory of cruise and ballistic missiles and, more recently, focusing on its drone program. Prior to this most recent war, it was estimated that Tehran could produce 10,000 drones per month with thousands more ballistic missiles. The focus on these offensive systems have provided the regime with flexibility and deniability, making them attractive tools to proxies in Yemen, Lebanon. and even Russia.
During the war, these relatively cheap platforms struck thousands of targets across the region. Others were also taken out by expensive interceptors – from the American THAAD or Patriot to the Israeli Arrow, David’s Sling, or Iron Dome.
Iran’s infamous ballistic missiles fitted with cluster submachines inflicted a wider range of damage across Israel. Israeli systems, especially David’s Sling, were unable to handle the cluster munitions.
Back to the ceasefire
Both the US and Israel have said that they struck thousands of targets in Iran, especially the country’s defense industrial base.
IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir said that the IDF’s achievements in the war against Iran “are unprecedented and historic,” and that “Iran before this war is not the same Iran [as now]; it is much weaker.
Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Gen. Dan Caine said that the US attacks “destroyed Iran’s defense industrial base and their ability to reconstitute those capabilities for years to come. We attacked, along with our partners, approximately 90 percent of their weapons factories. Every factory that produced Shahed one-way attack drones was struck. Every factory that produces the guidance systems that go into those drones was struck.”
But similar remarks were made by Israel in the 12 Day War last June. Nine months later, there were still thousands of targets in Iran for both militaries to hit. So how much was really destroyed? How much is left? How easily will Iran re-arm itself? Iran’s leadership, now even more extreme than before the war, might double down on missile and drone development during the ceasefire.
A month of war will have helped Iran’s battered yet resilient military industry learn for the next war. Ceasefires can create conditions that accelerate the development of offensive systems. When immediate operational demands decrease, resources can shift toward testing and integration. This pattern is visible in Iran’s missile and drone programs, which, despite everything, continued to improve in accuracy, survivability, and responsiveness.
Regional context
The broader regional context reinforces this dynamic. Drone warfare has become a central feature of modern conflicts, and Iran has been both a contributor to and beneficiary of this shift.
Iran’s use of low‑cost, high‑volume drones such as the Shahed family reflects a global trend toward scaling inexpensive, accurate systems that reshape the battlefield, especially during Russia’s war against Ukraine. Moscow quickly adopted the platform and locally produced variants of the design were made and even shipped back to Iran and used against Gulf targets that for years had worked to stay out of any conflict between Iran and Israel
During the war, thousands of Iranian drones wreaked havoc across the Gulf States and the regime’s drone fire led several nations to reach out to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy for cheap interceptors to take out the Shaheds. It was as if wars had come full circle. Iran helped Russia against Ukraine. Now Ukraine was helping the Gulf against the Islamic Republic, which was being helped by Russia.
Ceasefires also affect supply chains and procurement networks. Iran’s missile and drone programs rely on a mix of domestic production and imported components, including electronics and materials that can be sourced through commercial channels.
Countries like China continue shipping to Iran and will also aid in the recovery of its military industry. Beijing has been critical in helping Iran build its arsenal, and even sold the regime precision machine tools and guidance components, such as gyroscopes and accelerometers. Even during the war, Beijing shipped critical components, notably precursor chemicals for missiles.
Periods of reduced kinetic activity can ease pressure, allowing for Iran to once again clandestinely reorganize, restock, and even expand their weapons procurement.
Friendly fire
At the same time, the ceasefire will allow Israel and the United States to adjust their own technological posture. Both nations continue to invest heavily in counter‑drone and missile defense systems, and these systems depend on continuous software updates, data integration, and doctrinal refinement.
After the war in June, Israel carried out several updates to the Iron Dome and David’s Sling systems and will likely do so again, to incorporate lessons learned from this round. The war made it clear that static air defense systems are major targets for Iran, and measures must be taken to protect or hide them better.
The Israel Air Force, which was the main corps involved in the war, has also likely learned important lessons following the downing of an American F-15 fighter by Iran during the last week of the war and will work towards better defenses on its platforms.
Israel might also work towards incorporating more at-scale production of counter-drone technology at-scale likethe US, which began deploying the LUCAS low‑cost one‑way attack drones modeled on Iranian Shahed designs.
The technological competition is not, and cannot be, one‑sided as both sides use the periods of calm to prepare for future scenarios. But that results in a strategic paradox. While a ceasefire reduces immediate risk to civilian populations, it also marks the beginning of a new phase of technological adaptation.
The Islamic Republic’s missile and drone programs have advanced through decades of sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and intermittent conflict. Iran’s new leadership still views these technologies as essential to its long‑term objectives of reshaping regional and global power dynamics, and their development will continue as long as the regime and their objectives remain in place.
Understanding this distinction between halting fire and halting development is essential for assessing what a ceasefire with Iran can actually change.
A ceasefire can stop the exchange of missiles and drones, but it will not stop the laboratories, workshops, training facilities, or procurement networks that support Iran’s military capabilities.
Those will continue to operate according to strategic timelines that extend far beyond the duration of any ceasefire and the effects of that work will become visible only when hostilities resume. Be that in two weeks time, two months, or two years.